May was India’s busiest defence month of the year so far. PM Modi toured five countries in six days - the UAE, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Italy. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh visited Vietnam and South Korea. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio came to New Delhi. India and Australia held their tenth Defence Policy Talks, and the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting in Delhi added a wider Indo-Pacific track to the month’s defence agenda.
This edition covers four themes: defence partnerships with Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden; India-Vietnam cooperation in defence exports, sustainment and emerging technologies; the new India-UAE strategic defence framework against the backdrop of the West Asia conflict; and the Quad, India-US and India-Australia exchanges shaping the Indo-Pacific agenda.
In Focus:
India-Europe: Defence Industrial Engagement with Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden
Between 15 and 20 May, PM Modi’s European tour produced three distinct defence tracks: an industrial reset with Italy, a maritime and technology conversation with the Netherlands, and a manufacturing and defence-innovation track with Sweden. Coming a month after the India-Germany Defence Industrial Cooperation Roadmap, covered in our previous edition, these engagements show how India’s defence conversations with Europe are expanding beyond traditional procurement into industrial roadmaps, technology partnerships and manufacturing arrangements.
In Italy, the two countries elevated ties to a Special Strategic Partnership and adopted an India-Italy Defence Industrial Roadmap covering helicopters, naval platforms, marine armament, electronic warfare, co-development and co-production. A Joint Declaration of Intent on defence cooperation was signed alongside, and a Maritime Security Dialogue was launched.
This is significant because India-Italy defence ties had been effectively frozen for nearly a decade after the AgustaWestland controversy. Italy’s share of India’s defence imports had fallen from roughly 1.7 percent in 2008-2013 to just 0.4 percent in 2020-2025. The reset has been gradual and specific - an MoU between Adani Defence & Aerospace and Leonardo for helicopter manufacturing in January, followed by a ₹1,896 crore contract with Fincantieri-WASS for 48 Black Shark heavyweight torpedoes in late 2025. The defence roadmap now gives that recovery a more formal defence-industrial frame.
The Italy track also matters because of where Italian industry sits in Europe’s defence base. Italy is one of the three industrial partners in the Global Combat Air Programme, the sixth-generation fighter initiative with the United Kingdom and Japan. India’s Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan confirmed in March that India is evaluating its options between GCAP and the Franco-German-Spanish FCAS programme. Seen in that context, the May roadmap is less about any immediate GCAP pathway and more about placing India in a closer defence-industrial conversation with one of the countries shaping Europe’s next-generation combat aviation base. That matters at a time when India is still assessing how it wants to approach future air combat capability, and whether its next step should be through acquisition, co-development, industrial participation or a combination of these.
In the Netherlands, both sides elevated ties to a Strategic Partnership and adopted a five-year roadmap that includes work toward a Defence Industrial Roadmap, defence technology collaboration and a possible mutual logistics support arrangement. While the Netherlands would typically not be seen as a conventional headline defence partner for India, its relevance is specific. Dutch strengths in port security, maritime logistics, underwater surveillance and protection of seabed infrastructure fit closely with India’s growing concern around undersea cables, offshore energy assets and maritime infrastructure. This was followed up at Shangri-La, where Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh met Dutch Defence Minister Dilan Yeşilgöz-Zegerius for discussions on defence cooperation, military-to-military ties and defence industrial collaboration.
Semiconductor capacity is increasingly now a part of the industrial base behind advanced defence systems, from radar and missile guidance to electronic warfare and secure communications. In that context, the signing of the ASML-Tata Electronics partnership, in the presence of the Dutch and Indian Prime Ministers, for India’s semiconductor fabrication plant at Dholera is of extreme importance to India’s wider defence technology base, even though it might seem to sit outside the visit’s formal defence outcomes.
In Sweden, the two sides established a Strategic Partnership backed by a Joint Action Plan for 2026-2030. The defence pillar within this plan already has a physical anchor: Saab’s manufacturing facility in Haryana for the Carl-Gustaf M4 recoilless rifle system, the company’s first production unit outside Sweden and the first defence plant in India under the 100 percent FDI route. The Action Plan goes further, calling for institutionalised joint staff talks, cooperation on defence innovation, and greater Swedish investment in India’s defence corridors. Saab was also among the Swedish companies represented in the CEO engagement during PM Modi’s visit, where discussions covered investment, advanced manufacturing, AI, semiconductors, electronics and deep-tech manufacturing. Finally, the Sweden-India Technology and Artificial Intelligence Corridor (SITAC), announced during the visit, formalises cooperation in fields such as AI, 6G and quantum computing, technologies, all of which have significant implications for autonomous systems, communications dominance and electronic warfare as modern research suggests.
This Europe visit builds on the trend we noted in January and April: European rearmament is beginning to affect India’s defence partnerships not only through procurement, but through industrial roadmaps, technology channels and manufacturing arrangements.
India-Vietnam: Defence Cooperation Moves into Exports, Sustainment and Emerging Technologies
Vietnam has become one of the clearest examples of India’s Act East policy acquiring a harder defence edge. President To Lam’s state visit to India from 5th to 7th May, elevated bilateral ties to an Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s visit to Vietnam on 19 May carried this engagement forward through training, technology cooperation and naval capability support.
India’s Military College of Telecommunication Engineering and Vietnam’s Telecommunications University exchanged an MoU on cooperation in artificial intelligence and quantum technology. India has also supported the Army Software Park at the Telecommunications University in Nha Trang, and both countries will co-chair the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Cyber Security for the 2027-2030 cycle. These agreements embed Indian technology and training inside Vietnamese military institutions, marking a form of engagement qualitatively different from direct defence platform sales.
Notably, at the Shangri-La Dialogues, Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh stated that a deal with Vietnam for the supply of BrahMos missiles is in its final stages. If implemented, this would be India’s most consequential defence export to Vietnam so far, and would make Vietnam another Southeast Asian partner for the BrahMos system after the Philippines, which became the first export customer for the missile under a USD 375 million deal signed in 2022.
The BrahMos confirmation sits within a wider maritime capability package. The USD 500 million defence line of credit, first committed during PM Modi’s 2016 visit to Vietnam and later advanced through the 2022 defence vision process, is now moving toward execution. MEA Secretary (East) P. Kumaran confirmed that projects worth USD 300 million have been identified and tendering is underway for 14 high-speed patrol boats and three to four offshore patrol vessels, with the remaining USD 200 million earmarked for naval ship upgrades and submarine battery procurement. PM Modi separately offered maintenance, repair and overhaul support for Vietnam’s Sukhoi Su-30 fleet and Kilo-class submarines, platforms that India operates domestically. That offer is strategically important because Russia’s ability to service these platforms has come under pressure; if Vietnam takes it up, Indian facilities would become part of Hanoi’s support architecture for Russian-origin equipment.
Vietnam’s procurement context explains why this matters. Russia’s share of Vietnam’s arms imports has reportedly fallen from 95 percent in 2008-2013 to 22 percent in 2020-2025, creating one of Asia’s more significant supplier diversification openings. India’s current share remains modest, but missiles, patrol vessels, offshore patrol vessels, ship upgrades, submarine batteries and maintenance support align closely with Vietnam’s requirements. The relationship is shifting from capacity building to a more operational Act East defence partnership.
India-UAE: Strategic Defence Framework in a Maritime and Energy Security Context
On 15 May, PM Modi and UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed signed a Strategic Framework for Defence Industrial Collaboration in Abu Dhabi. Sources linked to the agreement indicated that both sides are targeting co-production in unmanned aerial vehicles, precision munitions, naval platforms and AI-enabled systems, following existing industry cooperation such as the ICOMM-CARACAL collaboration in small arms manufacturing.
The signing took place against the backdrop of the ongoing West Asia conflict. The UAE has absorbed more Iranian projectiles than any other Gulf state during the current hostilities, including an attack on the Fujairah oil terminal on 4 May in which three Indian nationals were injured. The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 60 percent of India’s energy imports transit, has been closed for two months. The energy agreements signed alongside the defence framework, including ADNOC’s expanded participation in India’s Strategic Petroleum Reserves and a provision for crude storage at Fujairah outside the Strait on the Gulf of Oman coast, show how defence and energy security have converged in the bilateral relationship under current conditions.
For India, the UAE is home to millions of Indian nationals, a critical energy supplier and a state sitting close to key maritime routes for trade and energy flows. That gives the defence framework a logic that precedes the current crisis. At the same time, analysts have noted the risks of deeper strategic alignment with a partner whose regional position is contested, and whose security ecosystem now overlaps with Israel’s after the Abraham Accords. The test will be whether the framework moves from joint production targets to actual manufacturing output and practical military cooperation.
The Quad, the United States and Australia: Maritime Surveillance and Indo-Pacific Interoperability
On 26 May, India hosted the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New Delhi, bringing together External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi. The meeting sat at the intersection of two bilateral tracks that had run through the month: Secretary Rubio’s four-day visit to India and the 10th India-Australia Defence Policy Talks held in New Delhi on 8 May.
The India-US track moved on both sustainment and future capability. Minister Jaishankar confirmed the renewal of the 10-year Major Defence Partnership framework agreement and the signing of a comprehensive underwater domain awareness roadmap. The United States also approved sustainment and logistics support for India’s Apache attack helicopters and M777 ultra-light howitzers, valued at a combined USD 428 million. Secretary Rubio described joint defence production as “ideal” for both countries and pointed to India’s “tremendous capacity” as a reason to move the partnership beyond procurement. That direction was reinforced at Shangri-La, where US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth pointed to India’s growing role in logistics, repair, maintenance and co-production.
On the India-Australia front, the Defence Policy Talks reviewed progress on the Joint Declaration on Defence and Security Cooperation and the Joint Maritime Security Collaboration Roadmap, both agreed at the 2024 leaders’ summit. Both sides confirmed that the first India-Australia Joint Staff Talks will be held later this year. Australia’s 2026 National Defence Strategy, released last month, named India a “top-tier” security partner and the most important defence partner in the Northeast Indian Ocean. The Australia track also continued at Shangri-La, where the two defence secretaries reviewed progress under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and discussed further defence cooperation.
These bilateral threads converged into the Quad meeting. Secretary Rubio announced the launch of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration Initiative, which will coordinate the four countries’ surveillance capabilities initially in the Indian Ocean and at Exercise Malabar, the naval exercise involving India, the United States, Japan and Australia. The Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness initiative, which provides near-real-time commercial satellite tracking data to partner countries for monitoring illegal fishing, trafficking and maritime threats, was expanded to the Indian Ocean. India also committed to hosting the next iteration of the Quad-at-Sea Mission, which brings the four coast guards together on a single vessel.
The defence significance of the Delhi meeting lies in these practical outcomes. None of them turns the Quad into a military alliance, and they should not be read that way. Their value instead is more specific - better maritime visibility, closer coast guard coordination, and a tighter link between Quad cooperation and Exercise Malabar. For India, the value is practical. With a hostile maritime neighbour to the west, an expanding Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and growing concern around sea lanes, undersea infrastructure and grey-zone activity, the Quad’s relevance lies in improving how quickly partners can see, share and coordinate in the same maritime space.
Defence Roundup:
● India’s indigenous naval shipbuilding programme reached a milestone with the Indian Navy taking delivery of INS Mahendragiri, the sixth and final advanced stealth frigate under Project 17A, built by Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders with 75 percent indigenous content.
● India successfully tested a long-range hypersonic anti-ship missile off the Odisha coast, reportedly capable of speeds reaching Mach 10 and a range of approximately 1,500 km.
●DRDO conducted a successful flight test of an advanced Agni missile equipped with Multiple Independently Targeted Re-Entry Vehicle technology.
● Lieutenant General NS Raja Subramani was appointed as the new Chief of Defence Staff and Vice Admiral Krishna Swaminathan as the next Chief of the Naval Staff, succeeding General Anil Chauhan and Admiral Dinesh Kumar Tripathi respectively.
● CDS General Anil Chauhan released the Joint Air Defence Doctrine, aimed at strengthening multi-layered air defence and improving integration, synergy and operational preparedness across the three services.
● India and Singapore held the 16th Defence Policy Dialogue in Singapore, reviewing defence engagements and discussing cooperation in defence industry, cyber security, AI, maritime security, unmanned systems and advanced defence technologies.
● During Minister Singh’s visit to Seoul, India and South Korea agreed to jointly develop laser weapons and advanced air defence systems, expanding bilateral cooperation beyond the K9 Vajra programme into directed-energy and next-generation platforms.
Defence Time Machine:
Ancient Indian military architecture treated the prākāra-parikhā (rampart-ditch) as one integrated defensive system: the ditch was dug out, its excavated earth raised into an embankment, and the whole structure then strengthened with walls, towers and controlled gateways. Pataliputra, the capital of Magadha from around the 5th century BCE, showed this logic at city scale. Built on the flood-prone strip between the Ganga and the Son, it was described by Megasthenes as a vast city protected by a wooden wall with 570 towers, 64 gates and a ditch around 182 m wide and 14 m deep.
Excavations at Bulandibagh later uncovered a 137 m-long wooden structure of heavy sleepers, believed to be part of this enclosure. What stands out is the design philosophy: the city's defence was built out of water, timber, terrain and controlled access, making it less a city with a wall around it and more a planned military landscape.
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