Summary of the Fourth Report of the Parliamentary Committee on the Empowerment of Women on Cyber Crimes and Cyber Safety of Women

• As per data by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), crimes against women rose by 239 percent between 2017 and 2022. Cases involving children rose twentyfold in the same period. 

• Over 2.48 lakh complaints related to women and children were filed on the National Cybercrime Reporting Portal (NCRP) between 2019 and April 2025.  

• Generative AI has introduced deepfakes, synthetic explicit content, and scalable impersonation as new and rapidly evolving threat vectors.  

• Existing technological interventions, like the Proactive Monitoring Tool (PMT), SAHYOG, and NCRP, require significant upgradation. The Committee found that AI-enabled crimes, encrypted platforms, and anonymisation tools are outpacing investigative and regulatory capacity. 

• The Committee noted serious underreporting due to stigma, digital illiteracy, and fear of retaliation, suggesting actual incidence is significantly higher. 

• Multiple States report acute shortages of skilled cyber investigators, digital forensic analysts, and prosecutors with techno-legal expertise. Training participation remains highly variable, with several frontline police stations still struggling with digital evidence preservation, deepfake detection, and cross-jurisdictional cybercrime investigations. 

1.Compliance timelines and periodic audits: Despite prescribed timelines, the Committee found that harmful content often remains accessible for extended periods. During one of the Committee meetings with Google and Meta, Members of Parliament (MPs) raised concerns about delays in removal of Non-Consensual Intimate Imagery (NCII), deepfakes, and Child Sexual Exploitative and Abuse Material (CSEAM), unchecked proliferation of fake accounts, lack of transparency in complaint handling, and weak regional language safeguards. MPs also pressed Google and Meta to provide year-wise and city-wise complaint data, staff strength deployed in India, and average turnaround time for responding to law enforcement requests through SAHYOG. They suggested new women-centric tools, such as a Safe Comment Section on YouTube and Safe DM filters on Instagram, alongside stronger awareness campaigns in regional languages and cyber safety education in schools. (Appendix IV, Page 116 of the Report) 

2.Personal accountability of Designated Officers (DO): It was noted that DOs under Rule 4(1) of IT Rules, 2021 are not currently personally accountable for compliance failures (like delays or negligence in responding to government orders related to women’s online safety). The Committee recommended for the DOs appointed by SSMIs to be made personally responsible for any such delays or negligence related to women’s online safety.  (Page 82 of the Report)  

3.Mandatory KYC-based verification: The Committee noted that fake profiles, impersonation, and anonymous harassment are among the most frequently reported forms of online abuse against women. The unchecked proliferation of anonymous accounts and the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) create practical impunity for perpetrators. (Page 81, 87 of the Report) 

4.Deepfake governance: The Committee notes that deepfake pornography and synthetic explicit content targeting women are rising sharply. These advancements have significantly complicated the detection, classification, and takedown of such content. (Page 68 and 77 of the Report) The Report also mentions the advisories issued by MeitY reiterating the SMI’s obligations under IT Rules. It emphasised that intermediaries must use technologies (like AI) responsibly, implementing content labelling, user awareness, and mechanisms for user reporting. (Page 28 of the Report)  

5.Mandatory SAHYOG integration: The Report finds that the onboarding of intermediaries onto SAHYOG and usage across States is uneven. (Page 85 and 112 of the Report) The Committee recommended that all intermediaries (including social media companies, messaging services, cloud platforms, dating apps, and Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs)) be mandated to integrate with SAHYOG for seamless, time-bound compliance. It was also recommended that MeitY establish enforceable timelines, automated compliance dashboards, and financial or legal penalties for non-compliance in the removal of harmful content. (Page 78 of the Report) 

6.CSEAM: Direct reporting to Indian LEAs: The Committee highlighted that SMIs would report CSEAM solely to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). NCMEC is a  a US-based non-profit body that operates a global cyber tipline and routes these reports to the I4C under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two bodies. The Supreme Court, in the Just Rights for Children Alliance case, acknowledged this MoU but observed that SMIs were using it as a substitute for direct reporting to Indian authorities (taking an “easy path”) without assuming the timely responsibility of alerting local LEAs who can take immediate enforcement action. The Committee stated here that this practice by the SMIs does not satisfy the legal obligation under Rule 11 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Rules 2020, (POCSO Rules) and the Supreme Court’s direction in the said case. SMIs are to report CSEAM directly to Indian LEAs, Special Juvenile Police Units, and cybercrime.gov.in. Non-reporting attracts liability under the POCSO Act and its rules, as well as under the IT Act. SMIs must also hand over the relevant material, including source information, to local police. (Page 61 and 62 of the Report) 

7.Age-appropriate regulation: The Committee noted that digital platforms, particularly social media, messaging, and hosting services, must be held to higher accountability standards on children’s and women's safety. To protect children and adolescents from adverse psychological impacts, the introduction of age-appropriate regulations and usage limits on social media platforms, alongside safety-by-design standards, was recommended. (Page 70 of the Report)  

8.Central Compliance Review Board: To enhance SMI’s accountability, the Committee recommended the creation of a Central Compliance Review Board, jointly operated by MeitY and MHA. The Board would evaluate platform-wise adherence to deadlines, responsiveness to State Police requests, and proactive removal of harmful content. Persistent non-compliance would attract penalties and result in the loss of safe harbour protection.  (Page 86 of the Report)  

9.Public awareness and community outreach: The Committee found that despite wide-ranging campaigns by MHA and MeitY, cyber safety awareness remains inadequate, particularly in rural and low-digital-literacy areas. Most initiatives are episodic rather than institutionalised, resulting in limited recall and low legal understanding. Women often hesitate to report due to stigma and unfamiliarity with reporting mechanisms. 

10.Strengthening investigation, forensics and law enforcement capacity: Existing capacity-building initiatives remain fragmented and uneven across States. These include CyTrain, Cyber Crime Prevention against Women and Children (CCPWC) Scheme, the National Cyber Forensic Laboratory (NCFL), State Connect, and Cyber Commandos. Multiple States report acute shortages of skilled cyber investigators and digital forensic analysts. Most States lack adequate tools for deepfake detection and advanced mobile forensics. 

11.Unified National Cyber Coordination Grid: Despite existing coordination structures like the Joint Cyber Crime Coordination Teams (JCCTs), SAMANVAYA, and Cyber Multi Agency Centre (CyMAC), States continue to face difficulties securing timely cooperation from SMIs and obtaining critical metadata for investigation. Delays of even a few hours allow morphed images and harmful content to go viral, causing irreparable harm to victims. 

14.Need for comprehensive cybercrime legislation: Cyber offences against women are currently addressed through multiple dispersed statutes i.e. the IT Act, BNS, POCSO, and the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986. This results in overlapping mandates, uneven enforcement, and procedural delays. The law remains largely offence-specific and incident-driven, rather than victim-centric and future-ready.